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One of the perils of working in the field of election law in the last 
twenty years is that every election cycle seems to bring with it a new 
crisis. The crises do not seem to replace each other, though; they 
simply pile up and place greater weight on an increasingly fragile 
system. Voting technology, long polling place lines, voter suppression, 
disinformation, and foreign interference each enjoy their five minutes 
of intense fame in a given election, and government policies mitigate 
them to some extent. But these originally novel concerns then become 
familiar and persistent dangers in the election threat portfolio.  
 
When I delivered this keynote speech at the conference at Ohio State 
on January 17, the threat du jour (or rather de l’année) was 
disinformation. Experts had, by then, expended countless hours 
thinking about how to address widespread lies—of foreign or domestic 
origin—intended to disrupt the 2020 election. We were preparing to 
fight the last voting war, in which Russian agents hacked and leaked 
emails, manipulated social and legacy media to foment division, and 
sought to change voters’ decisions on whether to vote and whom to 
vote for. The social media companies, we were told, were prepared for 
this now-familiar onslaught, or at least they had developed tools and 
measures to address the problems of 2016. But the threat had evolved 
so that attribution had become more difficult with the lines between 
foreign and domestic interference becoming blurrier in this new world, 
as had the distinctions between advertising and organic posts, 
journalism and propaganda, campaigns and outsiders, bots and 
humans. 
 
It is a sign of our through-the-looking-glass times that I can now be 
nostalgic for the moment when all we needed to fear was foreign 
takeover of the U.S. electoral system or widespread voter-targeted 
disinformation. These fears and their predecessors, still remain, of 
course. But COVID-19 eclipsed all the known-knowns and known-
unknowns of election threats, as it did everything else in our social, 
economic and political lives. Or at least, that was the case until the 
murder of George Floyd and the related protests temporarily moved 
the virus below the fold in the newspaper.   
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Eclipsed might not be the right word though, because the pandemic 
has made all of the extant election administration threats all the more 
severe. The cyber infrastructure of the electoral system—from the 
voting machines to election night reporting systems—still remains 
vulnerable. In fact, the move to vote-by-mail adds more technology to 
the voting process in some states as their online voter registration 
systems become more central to the election and they need quickly to 
acquire new machines (scanners, sorters and the like) that they have 
not used before. The threat of polling place mismanagement that could 
lead to long Election Day lines has not disappeared—in fact, it has 
now become deadly. The specter of disinformation over the voting 
process now expands to include that related to the COVID-election 
nexus, as election officials prepare for lies on everything from false 
outbreaks and polling place closures to vote-by-mail myths and 
misdirection on how to vote under pandemic conditions. Moreover, all 
of these complex, combined stresses occur in a context of 
unprecedented political polarization over the most basic principles of 
American democracy, voting, and elections. 
 
In times like these—and in truth, there are no times like these—it may 
be helpful to break down the overwhelming problem into its 
component parts. Recognizing that we cannot “solve” the novel 
election-related problems the pandemic poses, society can still try to 
mitigate some of the downside risks to the democracy and take the 
pandemic off the list of existential threats for the 2020 election. 
 
To be clear, it does not have to be this way. Other countries have run 
successful elections in the midst of the pandemic, and the United 
States could too. South Korea, for example, recently ran a national 
election without incident.1 Voters complied with social distancing, 
used hand sanitizer, wore masks and gloves, and had their temperature 





1 Sangmi Cha, South Korea: No New Domestic Coronavirus Cases, No Transmission from 
Election, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/south-
korea-domestic-coronavirus-transmission-election-covid19/. 
2 Hyonhee Shin, South Korea Holds Elections Under Strict Safety Measures Amid 
Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 15, 2020), 
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were shuttled to separate, more secure polling stations. So, it can be 
done with proper resource allocation, national leadership, and a 
nonpartisan, management-centered approach to elections.  
 
Certain inherent features of the U.S. electoral system, however, make a 
rapid transition to “healthy elections” very difficult. First, the extreme 
decentralization of election administrative authority prevents a 
coordinated, national approach to the challenge. The Constitution 
accords primary authority to the states to run national elections, with 
potential for Congressional override.3 That authority is delegated 
further, on many important questions of election administration, to 
roughly ten thousand local jurisdictions. Although states will make 
important policy decisions regarding vote-by-mail and other issues, 
many of the critically important administrative decisions for the 
upcoming elections will be made at the local level.  
 
Second, the election-related decisions made at the state and federal 
level are often entrusted to officials elected or appointed on a partisan 
basis, and election policy preferences in the United States are 
increasingly assuming a partisan structure. On the one hand, this point 
is a familiar and obvious one: Republicans and Democrats disagree 
over critical questions of election policy, just like almost every other 
political issue. Given that the President is also the most prominent 
voice in most of these debates, his position on issues such as vote-by-
mail reverberates throughout the political system, constraining choices 
co-partisans can make. However, decentralization often counters this 
extreme polarization at higher levels, as local officials exercise 
discretion to address voter concerns within the boundaries of what the 
states permit. Moreover, in some cases, previous decisions set 
boundaries on the effect of polarization in election policy. For 
example, Utah’s decision in 2016 to move to predominantly mail-




3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1. 
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ready to undo.4 The Republican-run states of Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska 
and West Virginia are also planning to send absentee ballot 
applications to all voters.5 So while the parties have hardened their 
positions on many issues, the farther one goes down the election 
administration hierarchy, the less polarized officials seem to be.  
Nevertheless, when partisans can place a thumb on the scale for their 
favored candidate, they are often in a position to do so. 
 
Third, the U.S. is not unique in this regard, but our reliance on 
volunteers to staff polling places and serve as the point of contact for 
voters places great stress on the system when those volunteers are 
unavailable. Poll worker and polling place shortages are perhaps the 
greatest constraints the pandemic places on Election Day voting. Half 
the nation’s poll workers are over the age of 61—the population most 
at risk from the virus.6 A large share of that existing workforce will not 
serve this year, so jurisdictions desperately need to find new workers, 
who will require both classical poll worker training as well as new 
training on how to deal with COVID-19 in the polling place. 
 
One might also add a fourth structural feature: American elections are 
the most complicated in the world. Americans vote for more offices 
and ballot measures, are divided into more overlapping districts, and 
experience greater diversity in balloting between jurisdictions. Some 
jurisdictions administer elections in over a dozen languages. Some 
states run their elections on multiple voting technologies. The 
combined effect of this complexity is that the system is not well-suited 





4 See Robert Gehrke, Vote by Mail Isn’t Nearly as Scary as Coronavirus. Just Ask Us Utahns, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/04/08/robert-gehrke-vote-
by/. 
5 Joseph Marks & Tonya Riley, The Cybersecurity 202: Trump Is Trying to Make Mail Voting 




6 Carrie Levine, Elderly Poll Workers Run U.S. Elections. But COVID-19 Will Keep Legions 
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concerted fashion in a short period of time. When it comes to absentee 
and mail voting, for example, it is not enough just to “mail everyone a 
ballot”—officials need to make sure that they mail the right ballot to 
the right person at the right address.  
 
To be concrete, the pandemic’s challenge to the electoral system 
concerns how to alter the mode of voting to ensure social distance for 
tens of millions of people. This requires both a massive shift to 
absentee and mail balloting and reconfiguration of polling places to 
ensure social distance. Many difficult logistical challenges need to be 
overcome. Elsewhere, MIT Professor Charles Stewart, III and I discuss 
at a high level the steps necessary to make the transition to “healthy 
elections.”7   
 
Here, I want to put forward ten concrete proposals that governments, 
private industry and civil society can advance to deal with the election-
related effects of the pandemic. For the most part, these proposals deal 
with the “people, places, and things” necessary to move to mail 
balloting and safe polling places, but some recommendations deal with 
development of new procedures and systems. Each grows from a 
recognition that whatever we do, it must be done immediately—
meaning it must be initiated well before we know the status of the 
virus on Election Day. We cannot wait until August or September 
before the country mobilizes to run an election under pandemic 
conditions.   
 
1. If not more money, then free postage, fully funded poll 
workers, and PPE for election workers.  
 
Congress needs to provide adequate funding to allow jurisdictions to 
meet the unexpected election-related costs of the pandemic. In the 
CARES Act, Congress appropriated $400 million for election-related 





7 Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Ten Recommendations to Ensure a Healthy and 
Trustworthy 2020 Election, LAWFARE (Mar. 19, 2020, 4:33 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/ten-recommendations-ensure-healthy-and-trustworthy-2020-
election. 
8 CARES Act, Pub. L. No 116-136, H.R. 748, 250 (2020). 
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equipment purchases to ensure all eligible voters who wish to vote can 
do so without risking their health. Indeed, given the tightening of state 
budgets due to the COVID-related recession, even more money is 
needed on top of that specifically earmarked for COVID-response for 
states to pull off anything resembling a normal election. The Brennan 
Center estimates the cost at around $2 billion.9 
 
If Congress proves unwilling to make such an investment, it could still 
facilitate the provisions of in-kind assistance that might be just as 
valuable. First, it could underwrite all postage costs related to election 
mail. Doing so would subsidize the postal service at a time when it 
needs the money, remove much of the cost to jurisdictions that 
accompanies vote-by-mail and absentee balloting, and ensure that no 
voter needs to place postage on any of the mail related to voting. (Fun 
fact: Even in those states that do not provide voters with prepaid 
envelopes for absentee balloting, the postal service will still deliver 
them if they are placed in the mail.10) Not only do voters receive and 
transmit many ballots by mail, but all the sample ballots, voter 
education materials, and related applications (for registration and mail 
balloting) are often distributed through the mail. Neither voters nor the 
local jurisdictions should be placed on the hook for postage related to 
these costs. 
 
Second, Congress needs to provide the personal protective equipment 
(PPE) necessary for voters and poll workers. It can draw from the oft-
described federal stockpile to provide a one-time allocation of face 
shields, masks, gloves, and sanitizer to the states.11 This will ensure 
that the states do not compete against each other, as they have with 






9 Edgardo Cortés et. al., Estimated Costs of Covid-19 Election Resiliency Measures, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/estimated-costs-covid-19-election-resiliency-measures. 
10 E.g., Mark Niesse, Mailed Ballots in Georgia Will Be Counted, Even Without a Stamp, AJC 
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/mailed-ballots-
georgia-will-counted-even-without-stamp/4P04UcxpZuJ1jZVXgDbixO/.  
11 See generally U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., About the Strategic National Stockpile, 
PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/about.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 16, 2020).  
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Third, Congress could provide funding for hazard pay for poll workers 
and rent payments for polling places. Especially since mail balloting 
has become a political football at the national level, defraying the costs 
of polling places and poll workers should meet with bipartisan support. 
All appropriate federal facilities, as well, should be made available to 
local election officials to be used as polling places.   
 
2. Establish a national poll worker corps. 
 
States need to do everything they can to address the widespread 
shortfall in poll workers. To be sure, they should try to mobilize 
students, teachers, all public employees, and any number of other 
groups to volunteer on Election Day. Election officials will tell you, 
however, that they are facing a crisis when it comes to personnel for 
Election Day and early voting. Their most reliable volunteers, most of 
whom are over the age of 60, are sending the message that they will 
not be available this year, because of risks to their health. Most 
recently, officials in Anchorage, Alaska reported that they lost ninety-
five percent of their regular election workers.12 Local election officials 
need to know now that they will have access to a dependable work 
force to staff polling places on Election Day and at early voting centers 
and to assist in the logistics for mail balloting.  
 
For its primary, Wisconsin called in the National Guard at the last 
minute to provide critical assistance at the polls.13 Many polling places 
might not have opened, but for the mobilization of 2400 members of 





12 James Brooks, With Elections Looming, Alaska Faces a Shortage of Poll Workers Because 





13 See Joe Trovato, In a First for Wisconsin National Guard, Citizen Soldiers and Airmen 
Serve as Poll Workers Across Wisconsin on Election Day, WIS. DEP’T MIL. AFF. (Apr. 7, 
2020), https://dma.wi.gov/DMA/news/2020news/20053. 
14 Nathaniel Persily & Tom Westphal, To Save the Election, Call in the National Guard: How 
to Safeguard the November Vote Despite Coronavirus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 08, 2020), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-to-save-the-election-call-in-the-national-
guard-20200408-zuud3aiu4bfixnokwiseeugeu4-story.html. 
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Governor, merely provided support to the civilian authorities. They 
were in plain clothes, unarmed, and did not show up in military 
vehicles. They also served in the communities in which they lived, to 
the extent possible. Kentucky also employed the National Guard to 
assist in its recent primary elections. 
 
The recent protests and violence in the wake of the murder of George 
Floyd, along with the concomitant crackdown by police and the 
National Guard, has made mobilization of the Guard for election 
purposes quite difficult. The last thing we need right now is any hint of 
militarization of polling places. The risk of violence at polling places 
is probably already higher than it has been in recent memory in the 
United States. If the Guard becomes an even more familiar force in 
quelling protests and supplementing police authority, their role in 
elections might become even more controversial. 
 
Although the Guard might still be available as a last resort, there are 
other classes of government workers who could be mobilized to deal 
with this crisis. Federal, state, and local governments should provide 
paid leave for Election Day to any employee who serves as a poll 
worker.  Especially in states where Election Day is a school holiday, 
teachers should be paid to serve as poll workers. Moreover, 
universities should cancel classes for Election Day or at a minimum, 
excuse absences for students who serve as poll workers.  Unless we 
find a substitute work force for the existing elderly corps of poll 
workers, election officials will be shutting down polling places for 
lack of people to work them.   
 
3. Mandate schools serve as polling places. 
 
Apart from closing polling places due to poll worker scarcity, election 
officials also face a shortage of adequate facilities to serve as polling 
places. Some of the most frequently used sites—such as schools, 
senior living centers, and firehouses—are taking themselves out of 
commission. Those in control of these sites cannot guarantee that on 
November 3, they will be amenable to seven hundred strangers 
walking through their facilities. Other existing facilities cannot 
guarantee social distancing, because they do not have sufficient space 
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to ensure six feet between voters waiting in line or between voting 
machines inside the polling place. As a result, some election officials 
have reported losing up to half of their polling places.  
 
Schools are the most ubiquitous polling places. Fully one third of 
voters cast their ballots in schools.15 If they are taken out of 
commission, we will have a full-on crisis with respect to polling 
places. More importantly, schools are uniquely accessible both for 
people with disabilities and for maintaining social distance. They often 
have large parking lots, auditoriums, gymnasiums, and sports fields. 
Few other types of facilities are as ubiquitous and accessible. 
 
Some states mandate that schools be made available on Election Day. 
All states should guarantee now that schools will be available as 
polling places this November, and that they will contain drop boxes for 
mail ballots to be deposited. If it means canceling school for 
November 3, then so be it. Even before the pandemic, having Election 
Day be a school holiday was one of the recommendations of the 
Presidential Commission on Election Administration.16  
 
4. Eliminate lines in polling places. 
 
Since the 2012 Election and the subsequent Report of the Presidential 
Commission on Election Administration (PCEA) (for which I was 
Research Director), much attention has been paid to preventing long 
polling place lines. The Commission put forth recommendations and 
tools to reduce lines, which were then further developed by the 
Bipartisan Policy Center in a program in collaboration with Professor 





15 Mike Kennedy, Recommendation: Keep Using Schools as Polling Places, AMERICAN SCHS. 
& U. MAG. (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.asumag.com/facilities-management/maintenance-
operations/article/20851548/recommendation-keep-using-schools-as-polling-places. 
16 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 33 
(2014), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-
01-09-14-508.pdf. 
17 MATTHEW WEIL, CHARLES STEWART III, TIM HARPER & CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, THE 2018 
VOTING EXPERIENCE: POLLING PLACE LINES (2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/the-
2018-voting-experience/. 
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ending, though, with each election containing hot spots in some areas 
of the country, often explained by a combination of mismanagement, 
faulty turnout predictions, and simple bad luck as machines break 
down or poll workers fail to show up. 
 
Long lines, which had previously served as an indicator of a nuisance 
or an administrative breakdown, now present a public health threat. If 
voters in November are forced to stand in lines akin to what some 
voters in Wisconsin and Georgia experienced in their primaries, then 
we can safely assume that many will simply turn away while others 
might contract the virus. Election officials need to signal now that 
measures will be taken to ensure that voters will not need to risk their 
health in order to vote. 
 
These risks to health from long lines are completely unnecessary: no 
voter should ever need to wait in a line to vote. One of the 
recommendations buried in the PCEA Report was for jurisdictions to 
explore the idea of allowing voters to “take a number” in order to 
vote.18 Commissioners had come to this realization after spending a 
day at Walt Disney World in Orlando, and watching how the Park had 
altered its line protocols for certain rides. Many are familiar with the 
Fast Pass, in which a rider schedules a ride for a particular time and 
then can jump the line when it is his or her turn. In other rides, such as 
Dumbo’s Flying Circus, riders are given a buzzer that will notify them 
when it is their turn to ride. In the interim, kids can spend time in a 
playground adjoining the ride. The system is similar to what you see in 
restaurants when a device buzzes when your table is ready.  
 
Nothing so involved is necessary for polling places. We need only 
follow the same model we see at deli counters around the nation: Take 
a number when you arrive, which will specify either your place in line 
or a time when you should return. Once receiving a number, a voter 
need not wait nearby the registration desk, but rather can wait outside 
the polling place until called, receive a text when ready, or return at 
the specified time. No special equipment is necessary; the poll workers 





18 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN, supra note 17, at 37. 
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voters to vote in the way to which they are accustomed but maintain 
social distance in ways familiar to their life outside of the polling 
place. 
 
5. Local election officials must coordinate with their local post 
offices immediately. 
 
Election mail is different than normal mail. In fact, the U.S. Postal 
Service has an entire “kit”19 and dedicated website20 for election mail. 
Jurisdictions that do not have experience with high volumes of mail 
balloting need to ascend a steep learning curve very quickly. They 
must, therefore, engage with their local postal officials to alert them of 
their plans for the fall. If they are outsourcing the mailing of election-
related materials to a vendor, they need to make sure that the vendor 
realizes election mail will be treated differently than other types of 
mail they are accustomed to sending. 
 
Failures to adequately partner with the postal service could prove 
disastrous in the fall. Mail that is not designated as “election mail” 
might be returned and therefore not reach the voters in time. 
Apparently, that is what happened in the Wisconsin primary with some 
share of the ten thousand mail ballots that voters never received 
because they were sent using normal commercial mail processes.21 In 
addition, failing to designate ballots as election mail might prevent 
them from receiving postmarks, which are often required by state law 
to verify that they were mailed on-time. Expert tip—when a piece of 
mail is placed in the system it will still be marked with an orange bar 
code that contains within it data as to the date, even if no postmark 
prints the date specifically on the mail. State statutes that specify a 





19 Election Mail Kit & Resources, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://about.usps.com/election-
mail/election-mail-resources.htm [https://perma.cc/S4F2-YZHR]. 
20 Election Mail, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://about.usps.com/gov-services/election-mail/ 
[https://perma.cc/LCY7-AU76]. 
21 Nick Corasantiti & Stephanie Saul, Inside Wisconsin’s Election Mess: Thousands of Missing 
or Nullified Ballots, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/us/politics/wisconsin-election-absentee-
coronavirus.html 
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these other methods by which the postal system designates dates on a 
piece of mail. 
 
In short, election mail involves more than dropping thousands of 
envelopes on your local post office without notice. Although we 
ordinarily do not think of the United States as having a national 
election authority, in an election in which more than seventy million 
people vote by mail, the postal service becomes that election authority. 
The local jurisdictions need to treat it as such, even while 
understanding that its funding is in doubt and it is undergoing great 
strain as an institution. 
 
6. Tech companies must take on the responsibility of 
supporting the election administration infrastructure. 
 
Amazon, Google, and Facebook provide essential services during the 
pandemic, and the election is no exception. Each company has a 
unique responsibility to do what it can to make sure the election is run 
as smoothly as possible under the circumstances. As Americans spend 
more and more time in front of screens and less time in the locations 
where the critical pre-election activities would normally take place, the 
democracy-protecting responsibilities of the tech platforms have 
become even weightier. 
 
If the United States had a functional and coordinated national 
response, a federal agency like the Election Assistance Commission 
would manage the election administration supply chain and deliver to 
local jurisdictions everything they need to run a healthy election. Some 
non-governmental organizations, such as Business for America, are 
attempting, in small ways, to fill that void.22 But no company is better 
situated than Amazon to handle the massive supply chain challenges 
that the pandemic poses for election officials. The company already 





22 Vote Safe in 2020, BUS. FOR AM., https://www.bfa.us/ [https://perma.cc/69AN-BWG5]. 
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officials responsible for responding to the pandemic.23 Election 
officials should have access to that as well. This section of the website 
should include both the generic COVID-related products (sanitizer, 
masks, gloves, face shields, plexiglass barriers), as well as (to the 
extent feasible) the kinds of materials specifically appropriate for 
elections, such as pens for optical scan ballots or disinfectant for 
voting machines.24  
 
Google has a different responsibility. They have historically partnered 
with the Voting Information Project25 (VIP), now run by Democracy 
Works, to provide data about polling place locations, ballot 
information, and voter registration procedures. Those portals and tools, 
including the Civic Information API,26 are more critical now than ever, 
and they are more difficult to get right than ever before. They need to 
invest heavily in those tools. They also need to add a ballot drop-box 
finder to the tool so voters with mail ballots know where they could 
drop them off. (I understand Democracy Works is doing just that.) 
These tools, the quality of which is always dependent on the 
completeness of the data jurisdictions make available, face increased 
challenges as jurisdictions make significant, last-minute changes to 
polling place locations over the next few months.  
 
Facebook also makes use of similar data in its Election Information 
Page,27 but for the most part it forwards users to the state’s websites. 
Facebook, like Google, needs to take a more active role in facilitating 





23 COVID-19 Supplies on Amazon Business, AMAZON BUS., 
https://business.amazon.com/en/work-with-us/healthcare/covid-19-supplies 
[https://perma.cc/YR6W-5SLQ]. 
24 See Alexa Corse & Robert McMillan, Voting by Mail in November? States Need to Prepare 





25 VOTING INFO. PROJECT, https://www.votinginfoproject.org/ (last visited June 1, 2020). 
26 Civic Information API, GOOGLE, https://developers.google.com/civic-information 
[https://perma.cc/754H-NF2Q]. 
27 Election Information on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ElectionInfo/ 
(last visited June 1, 2020). 
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be one of the major ways that voters receive election information (let 
alone candidate advertising) this election. It needs to provide generous 
free advertising to local election jurisdictions to target voters with 
messages related to registration, mail balloting, and polling place 
locations. It also needs to facilitate messaging from local election 
officials who are trying to recruit poll workers. As it rolls out state-
specific pages for the election, it must also include in its COVID 
Information Center28 election-specific messaging from local officials 
related to volunteering, voter registration, and even supply chain 
requests.  
 
7. Local election administrators desperately need 
management tools to help predict mail and polling place 
turnout. 
 
More than anything else, the pandemic has injected uncertainty into 
the electoral process. This uncertainty can be paralyzing for officials 
who need to make procurement and planning decisions now for the 
general election. No one knows what the status of the virus will be 
come November, however. Indeed, one of my greatest fears is that 
election officials will become complacent if rates of infection drop 
over the summer, only to be met by a resurgent pandemic in October 
right before the election.  
 
In the fog of the pandemic, it becomes especially difficult for election 
administrators to plan for how many voters will vote by mail, how 
many will vote early in-person, and how many will vote on Election 
Day. A great deal hinges on officials’ ability to make these 
predictions. It is all well and good to insist that administrators put 
everything in place for total vote-by-mail and massive Election Day 
turnout “just to be safe,” but these officials live in a world of scarce 
resources in which dedicating money, people, and time toward one 






28 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Information Center, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/coronavirus_info/?page_source=notif_coronavirus_updates&notif
_id=1589832881305430&notif_t=coronavirus_update&ref=notif (last visited June 1, 2020). 




This problem is not new to the pandemic, of course. Election officials 
make difficult resource tradeoffs all the time, and some will plan 
poorly in a given election. The problem for this election is that 
significant planning and procurement decisions need to be made now, 
and we have little evidence to go on as to the critical factors that will 
affect election administration in November.  
 
Everything seems up in the air. We do not know how many poll 
workers or polling places will be available. We do not know how 
many people will be shifted to vote-by-mail and how many will prefer 
to vote in person. Indeed, given the stalling of voter registration efforts 
due to COVID, we have little understanding as to whether the normal 
pace of registration will emerge before the election. 
 
We need election officials and management scientists to work together 
to develop the tools to help plan for these decisions for the fall. It 
might involve large surveys of the relevant population, as well as 
experiments in the remaining primaries and special elections over the 
summer. All of this will only give a blurry view of what to expect, 
however. Jurisdictions that misallocate resources may find themselves 
without sufficient numbers of mail-in ballots, same-day ballots, polling 
places, or poll workers.  
 
8. Don’t forget about disinformation.  
 
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, pundits tend to focus on one 
theme for each election. For the 2020 Election, the disinformation 
theme was quickly replaced by COVID as the shiniest attention-
grabbing object. The disinformation threat never went away, however. 
In fact, the pandemic magnifies the disinformation threat and places 
greater responsibility on governments and platforms to combat it.  
 
Although we should expect 2016-style disinformation about the 
candidates and campaigns, the type of pandemic-related election 
disinformation that should receive the greatest attention concerns false 
claims about the voting process. Before the pandemic, platforms were 
already removing disinformation that clearly misled voters over voting 
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procedures—e.g., “you can vote on a Wednesday” or “text this number 
to have your vote counted.” The pandemic expands the range of such 
messages that might intentionally mislead voters.  
 
As the voting process becomes more complicated due to measures 
adopted to deal with COVID, bad actors can more easily muddy the 
information waters so as to confuse voters on how to vote correctly. It 
is easy to confuse new mail voters about the necessary procedure to 
apply for an absentee ballot and to vote it correctly. For example, 
voters who have no experience voting by mail might be surprised to 
learn they need to sign the outside of the envelope.29 It would be quite 
easy to stoke fear in voters’ minds about the potential loss of 
anonymity that might come from that or to mislead them into thinking 
they do not need to sign the exterior envelope. Similarly, one can 
imagine a whole host of Election Day misinformation about the 
emergence of a pandemic hotspot near a polling place, stories that a 
poll worker or voter contracted COVID, or rumors that members of the 
National Guard, the police, or random gangs were engaging in 
aggressive actions toward voters. Finally, after Election Day, as mail 
ballots require more time for counting, a greater window of 
opportunity exists for those falsely alleging fraud to cast doubt on the 
results before they are announced.  
 
As with disinformation generally, the best response may be to “flood 
the zone” with responsible information. Election officials are often 
outmatched, however, by political operatives who strategically time 
their messaging to achieve the greatest confusion. Mass education of 
voters as to how the election will be conducted is more important this 
year than in any previous election. All media organizations—TV, 
radio, print, and internet—have a responsibility to amplify the voices 
of officials running the process and to educate voters on how, when, 
and where to vote. The social media companies, in particular, need to 
treat COVID-election disinformation the same way they are now 





29 See e.g., Voting by Mail, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS CAL., https://cavotes.org/vote/how-
vote/voting-mail [https://perma.cc/8BZB-9GCV]. 
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and to develop machine learning to flag COVID-related vote-
suppressive content when it is posted. 
 
9. Don’t forget about cybersecurity. 
 
Just as we cannot forget about the foreign and domestic threats to the 
information environment, we cannot overlook the lingering security 
threats to the election cyber-infrastructure.30 Here, too, the pandemic 
adds to these problems and exacerbates them. As with life in general 
under the pandemic, in which we all increasingly rely on our screens 
and devices, an election system that relies ever more on technology 
provides greater opportunities for malicious actors to probe, hack, and 
cause doubt in our election system.  
 
In particular, the security of the online voter registration system, the 
voter registration databases, and the mail ballot system become even 
more critical in this election. Paper voter registration drives and door-
knocking campaigns are virtually nonexistent during the pandemic. 
Therefore, a disproportionate share of voter registration activities must 
be conducted online. Hacking of that online system is not beyond the 
capabilities of foreign or domestic adversaries. The Department of 
Homeland Security has made great strides in the last three years 
dealing with the critical infrastructure of the election system and its 
various cyber components. But as states make rapid and significant 
changes to their systems to deal with the changes forced by the 
pandemic, each change needs to be scrutinized for security 
vulnerabilities. 
 
The same is true of the voter registration databases and the other 
databases containing information as to who requested and returned 
mail ballots.31 These databases serve as the backbone for all election-





30 Alex Zaheer & Tom Westphal, Don’t Let COVID-19 Eclipse Election Security Concerns, 
LAWFARE (May 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-covid-19-eclipse-
election-security-concerns. 
31 Franklin Foer, Putin Is Well on His Way to Stealing the Next Election, ATLANTIC (June 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/putin-american-
democracy/610570/. 
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could have outsized downstream effects at the critical junctures when 
ballots are cast through the mail. Other technology, such as that 
involved in scanning mail envelopes and ballots, printing the bar codes 
on mail ballots, or reporting results on election night can also raise 
security concerns. At each stage in the lifecycle of a ballot, state and 
local officials must consider how new technology will be audited and 
penetration-tested to improve resiliency against a cyber-attack.    
 
10.  Do not call the winner until almost all votes are counted.  
 
An election run predominantly through mail is different than any other 
presidential election the United States has experienced. Most 
importantly, because of tens of millions of ballots not yet counted on 
election night, the winner may not be known until days later. 
Responsible media organizations need to resist the urge to call the 
election on election night if the result is in doubt and wait a few days 
until almost all of the ballots are counted.32  
 
Reporters need to educate themselves and the public as to what 
election night (and the days afterward) might entail. The process of 
opening, scanning, verifying, and counting millions of mail ballots can 
take days even when the process works perfectly. Many votes will be 
received well after Election Day, especially in the states that allow 
votes to count if they are postmarked by Election Day. The signature 
verification process33 for mail ballots, unknown to most voters, will 
hold in limbo hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of ballots for a 
week after Election Day, as local authorities seek to contact voters 
whose ballots were questioned because of a signature mismatch or 
missing signature. Voters usually have an opportunity to cure these 





32 See AD HOC COMM. FOR 2020 ELECTION FAIRNESS & LEGITIMACY, FAIR ELECTIONS DURING 
A CRISIS: URGENT RECOMMENDATIONS IN LAW, MEDIA, POLITICS, AND TECH TO ADVANCE THE 
LEGITIMACY OF, AND THE PUBLIC’S CONFIDENCE IN, THE NOVEMBER 2020 U.S. ELECTIONS 
(2020), https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/2020ElectionReport.pdf. 
33 See STAN. LAW SCH. LAW & POLICY LAB, SIGNATURE VERIFICATION AND MAIL BALLOTS: 
GUARANTEEING ACCESS WHILE PRESERVING INTEGRITY A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S 
EVERY VOTE COUNTS ACT (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/SLS_Signature_Verification_Report-5-15-20-FINAL.pdf. 
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Of course, the foreseeable delays due to mail ballot verification and 
counting are quite apart from what might happen if campaign lawyers 
get a hold of the process and litigate the validity of the vote in the days 
soon afterward. We are already seeing the claims of fraud in an effort 
to work the election refs and shape public perceptions. In an 
environment like this, election officials will be under greater pressure 
to deliver results as fast as they can. They need to do whatever they 
can to report accurate results as quickly as possible. But accuracy 
needs to take precedence over speed.  Responsible media organizations 
need to give election officials the space they need to avoid errors in the 
rush to announce a winner.  
 
The 2020 election presents unprecedented challenges to local election 
administrators and voters alike. These challenges are surmountable. 
We are seeing some states successfully run their primaries and special 
elections, and other countries around the world have run safe elections. 
If they have the proper resources and time to plan, the professionals 
who run our elections at the local level can pull this off. 
  
But that is a big “if.” Time is running out and the resources do not 
appear to be forthcoming. Election officials need to plan by mid-July 
as to which polling places will be open and what equipment needs to 
be procured. They need to know how many poll workers will be 
available to work on Election Day and in early voting centers.  
 
Great uncertainty remains as to how Americans will vote in 
November. It is possible that Americans will learn over the next four 
months how to live with the virus and adapt basic social and economic 
activities to social distancing. Elections might not be that different. 
 
However, the United States has never had to shift its system of 
election administration on such a massive scale in such a short period 
of time. We need to prepare for the worst and hope for the best. The 
lack of federal leadership and the partisan polarization that 
accompanies this shock make the transition particularly difficult. All 
who care about the validity of this election and the legitimacy of 
whoever emerges victorious need to join in the effort to create a 
healthy and safe 2020 Election.  
